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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Changing demographics in the United States, have resulted in
 
increased attention being paid to the long term health care field.
 
With the government paying for almost half of the total expenditures
 
on nursing home care, $18.29 billion dollars in 1986, issues
 
surrounding the operation of nursing homes are a focal point of
 
research (McKay, 1991).
 
Of particular interest in this research is the importance of
 
ownership type, profit versus non-profit, on quality of care and
 
operating efficiency.  Studies indicate that differences in costs
 
between profit and non-profit nursing homes exist.  The majority of
 
study findings indicate non-profit nursing homes generate
 
significantly higher costs than their proprietary counterparts.  This
 
fact can be interpreted two ways: non-profit firms may not pay
 
attention to costs, thus resulting in cost inefficiency or non-profit
 
firms may provide a more costly, higher quality service.
 
Researchers such as McKay (1991), Scanlon (1980), Fottler et al.
 
(1981), and numerous others, allege that profit and non-profit nursing
 
homes operate with differing motivations.  Profit or proprietary
 
nursing homes are assumed to be in business to make a profit.  They
 
make cost minimizing decisions, subject to regulatory constraints,
 
with the objective of maximizing profits.  Non-profits, on the other
 
hand, are assumed to pursue goals other than profit maximization.  One
 
assumption is that the goal of non-profit nursing homes is size
 
maximization, while maintaining quality of service and breaking even
 
(Scanlon, 1980).
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Frech (1985) attributes the different cost structures to the
 
different property rights existing between ownership types, which
 
promotes different behavior of nursing home operators.  Frech (1985)
 
theorizes that if the property rights of the decision maker to
 
residual profits are reduced, the price of nonpecuniary amenities
 
decline and their consumption increases.  In the case of non-profit
 
nursing homes, as the top decision maker has no claim to the residual
 
income of the nursing home, then this individual, subject to a set
 
salary, will maximize the amount of nonpecuniary goods attained.
 
These nonpecuniary goods include leisure, pleasant working
 
environment, prestige in the community, and numerous other items.
 
They are free to the top decision maker as long as the nursing home
 
makes enough money to pay the agreed upon salary (Frech, 1985).  As
 
profit maximization is no longer the primary goal of the firm, this
 
behavior leads to reduced managerial efficiency and lower firm wealth
 
(Frech, 1985).  Therefore, Frech's (1985) theory predicts that the
 
firm with attenuated property rights will experience higher costs and
 
be less efficient than those firms with private property rights.
 
Based on the above discussion, and studies which support the
 
claim that profit nursing homes are more efficient than non-profit
 
nursing homes, it is tempting to conclude profit homes are a superior
 
institution.  However, many researchers would strongly dispute this.
 
When the quality of care, the existence of market power, and the
 
population that is receiving nursing home are closely examined, one
 
can see the potential for problems in profit institutions.
 
Critics of profit nursing homes see a potential conflict of
 
interest in the motives of the nursing home in placing the goal of
 
profit maximization above the welfare of the patient (O'Brien et al.
 
1983).  Fottler's (1981) research indicates that this concern is not
 
unfounded.  Fottler's uses service intensity as a proxy for quality of
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care and finds a negative relationship between profitability and
 
quality for proprietary (profit) institutions in California.
 
The establishment of market power is a side effect of government
 
regulation, which has had profound influence on the operation of
 
nursing homes.  To control escalating costs, the government enacted
 
Certificate of Need (CON) legislation.  By 1979 almost all states had
 
adopted CON legislation, which allowed the government to 1) control
 
the number of beds in nursing homes per state, 2) establish and
 
monitor standards of care in these facilities, and 3) determine
 
reimbursement for nursing homes services.  This gave the government
 
indirect control over the number of medicaid patients and therefore
 
expenditures (Feldstein, 1988).
 
By restricting the number of beds, CON legislation created a
 
barrier to entry which limited competition.  Further, because the
 
government was lax in enforcing standards, substandard homes remained
 
in operation.  These consequences, combined with the fact that the
 
average occupancy rate in the nursing home industry was 95% (Felder
 
and Scanlon, 1980), led to market power.  The result has been that
 
nursing homes producers, through pursuing their own self interest, are
 
not meeting the needs of society.  The existence of market power has
 
taken away the consumers' ability to elicit a competitive response
 
from the providers of nursing home services.
 
An additional concern with proprietary nursing homes comes from
 
examining the characteristics of the population they serve.  Nursing
 
home patients are typically physically and mentally vulnerable and
 
become so impoverished by paying for care received, they often are
 
incapable of protecting their own interests in the nursing home (Hawes
 
and Phillips, 1986).  Therefore, the concern is that profit
 
maximization will lead proprietary nursing homes to pursue practices
 
which are not in the best interest of the clientele, and that they
 
will remain unchallenged in doing so.
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In support, Vogel (1983, page 586) states that there are certain
 
characteristics of the consumers of nursing home care "which reduce
 
their ability to elicit a competitive market response from providers."
 
Citing the work of Grossman (1972), Vogel goes on to describe the
 
nursing home population as a group of consumers which to a large
 
extent are "physically, mentally and financially debilitated and
 
dependent, a population whose stock of human capital is highly
 
debilitated."
 
Conversely, supporters of proprietary institutions, argue that
 
proprietary homes are more efficient than non-profit homes.  That is,
 
for a given level of quality, proprietary homes supply nursing home
 
care at lower cost (Koetting, 1980; Frech, 1985; Birnbaum, 1981).
 
Proponents also argue that as the industry is regulated, the
 
government protects consumers from harmful practices pursued in the
 
name of profit maximization.
 
An interesting extension to this discussion is to narrow the
 
classification of facilities from simply profit versus non-profit to
 
account for chain ownership.  This gives four main classes of nursing
 
homes: single proprietary, chain proprietary, chain non-profit and
 
non-profit nursing homes.  If economies of scale exist in the nursing
 
home industry, it is possible that homes which are part of a chain
 
will have lower operating costs.  Economic theory indicates that chain
 
ownership will affect costs if economies of scale exist at the firm
 
level as opposed to the plant level (McKay, 1991).  The distinction
 
between firm versus plant level economies of scale is that the former
 
occur if, at any given level of output, average costs are lower for
 
chain homes.  The latter occurs if average cost decreases as output
 
increases in a given facility (McKay, 1991).  There is no theoretical
 
reason to expect nursing homes to experience firm level economies of
 
scale, therefore it is an empirical question.  The results from
 
McKay's (1991) study will be discussed below.
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This paper examines the effect ownership classification has on
 
quality of care and operating costs where profit, non-profit, profit
 
chain, and nonprofit chain firms are considered.
 
The analysis will concentrate on the following three questions:
 
1)	  Do non-profit nursing homes spend significantly more on direct
 
patient care and, if so, does this mean they offer a higher
 
quality of care?
 
2)	  Is the patient mix different between ownership types and, if so,
 
does it affect the day to day operation of nursing homes?  Patient
 
mix is defined two different ways.  The first focuses on method of
 
payment and the second concentrates on patient characteristics as
 
defined by activities of daily living, ADL.
 
3)	  Does a difference in nursing home cost arise because non-profit
 
homes show a more charitable wage policy than their proprietary
 
counterparts?
 
These questions have important implications for policy
 
implications.  If, as the literature suggests, cost and quality
 
differences do exist amongst ownership types, these differences and
 
their effect on the operation of nursing homes must be examined if
 
effective public policy is to be prescribed.
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CHAPTER II
 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 
Do Non-Profit Homes Spend Significantly More on Direct Patient Care
 
and If So Does This Mean They Offer a Higher Quality of Care?
 
To put the following discussion in proper perspective one must
 
remember that there is no single agreed upon definition of quality of
 
care, much less how to correctly measure it.  To date, much of the
 
research on quality of care uses structural measures as proxies for
 
quality.  Structural measures focus on the characteristics of the
 
facility, for example patient dietary expenditures, expenditures on
 
RN's, laundry services, and other measures of resource use.
 
The validity of structural measures as opposed to measures which
 
focus on patient outcome, i.e. improvement, survival, and or
 
discharge, is widely debated (O'Brien et al., 1983).  Critics argue
 
that structural measures bear little or no relation to the quality of
 
care or quality of life provided by the facility.  Furthermore, there
 
have been several studies which have failed to find a statistically
 
significant relationship between structural and patient outcome
 
measures (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).
 
Despite such criticisms of structural measures, their use can be
 
supported.  Clearly a facility must have resources in order to use
 
them in patient care.  Thus availability of resources is a
 
precondition of use (Hawes and Phillips, 1986; Kleinsorge and Koenig,
 
1991; Meiners, 1982).  Furthermore, Linn et al. (1977) and Kurowski
 
and Breed (1981) point out that the inability to find a statistically
 
significant relationship between structural and outcome measures of
 
care may be due to the lack of variation in these independent
 
variables in the nursing homes studied (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).
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Finally, there are some studies which found resource use and
 
availability to be related to both outcome and structural measures of
 
quality (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).  For example, Linn et al. (1977)
 
found that the number of registered nurses hours per patient day was
 
positively related to the improvement, survival, and discharge from
 
the nursing home.  In addition, expenditures on food and the
 
availability of individual dietary planning were significantly
 
associated with some of the outcome measures of care (Hawes and
 
Phillips, 1986).
 
Although there is not a consensus on the validity of using
 
structural measures, the above studies support their use, at least as
 
partial indicators of quality.  Greene and Monahan (1981), American
 
Health Care Association (1977), The Virginia Joint Legislative Audit
 
and Review Commission (1977), Moden (1982), and Elkwell (1984), found
 
support for the hypothesis that non-profit homes spend more on direct
 
patient expenditures (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).  Non-profit homes
 
consistently had higher costs, defined in terms of facility
 
expenditures, than their proprietary counterparts, both in terms of
 
direct patient expenditures and average cost per patient day (McKay,
 
1991; Palmer, 1983; Hawes and Phillips, 1986; Meiners, 1982).  Average
 
cost per patient day includes expenditures on such items as plant and
 
equipment and administration.  The conclusion that dominates existing
 
literature is that non-profit homes provide a higher quality of care
 
to their patients than do their proprietary counterparts.  This
 
conclusion holds whether one is measuring quality of care based on
 
structural measures, or if one is using a more qualitative measure
 
such as complaints registered against facilities by family members or
 
the homes' patients themselves (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).
 
In contrast to the above studies, Kane and Kane (1980c) found
 
that resource availability, rather than ownership class was the
 
determining factor of quality of care (O'Brien et al 1983).  If homes
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had the resources then it was possible, regardless of ownership type,
 
to score high in terms of structural measures.  As will be discussed
 
in the next section, what becomes relevant is the patients' source of
 
payment.  Private pay and government subsidized patients have
 
different revenue generating potential.
 
A criticism of both structural and outcome measures of quality,
 
is that they fail to account for patient status prior to admission
 
(O'Brien et al, 1983).  If patients entering the two types of
 
facilities are in themselves different, thus requiring a different
 
level of care, it is misleading to make comparisons without accounting
 
for these differences.
 
When comparing a single proprietary facility to a chain
 
facility, existing studies indicate the overall expenditures per
 
patient day are not all that different (Hawes and Phillips, 1986;
 
Meiners, 1982).  However, there is a difference in the composition of
 
spending within facilities.  Chain facilities tend to spend less on
 
direct patient expenditures and more on property costs and
 
administrative costs (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).  This suggests that
 
the increased spending on property and administrative costs in chain
 
homes come at the expense of direct patient care expenditures (Hawes
 
and Phillips, 1986).
 
In contrast, McKay (1991) using Texas data, found that while
 
cost per day for both chain and single proprietary nursing homes was
 
significantly less than for nonprofit homes, there was a difference in
 
costs between the two types of for-profit homes.  McKay's work is
 
significant because the question of appropriateness of using pooled
 
data was explicitly addressed.  When a common regression was
 
estimated, the effect of chain ownership on cost was statistically
 
insignificant.  However, a test of the appropriateness of pooling the
 
data indicated separate regressions for each ownership type were
 
appropriate.  The findings indicate that chain home ownership does
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affect cost, with the effect depending on output level.  Average cost
 
was found to be higher for chain than single proprietary homes at low
 
and very high levels of output, but lower at intermediate output
 
levels (McKay, 1991).
 
Does Patient Mix Different by Ownership Type in Regards to Source of
 
Payment and Does It Affect Daily Operations?
 
Walsh (1979) and Ruchlin and Levey (1972) found that the
 
proportion of private pay patients is positively associated with
 
quality differences (McKay 1991).  Similarly, Fottler et al. (1981)
 
found quality of care was significantly higher in homes with a lower
 
proportion of medicaid patients.  The differences are attributed to
 
the different revenue generating capability of private and medicaid
 
patients.
 
Caswell and Cleverly (1983) found, in general, as the proportion
 
of medicaid patients increased, expenditures on patient care
 
decreased.  As discussed above, this is expected to have a negative
 
effect on the quality of care.  In addition, they found that nonprofit
 
facilities react far less strongly than profit institutions as
 
medicaid utilization increases.
 
Private pay patients are more attractive to most nursing homes
 
due to fact that the payments by medicaid/medicare are limited
 
compared to the payments of private pay patients.  The difference in
 
revenues from private pay patients and medicaid patients is estimated
 
to be from 13% to 30% higher for private pay patients (Hawes and
 
Phillips, 1986).  This gives nursing homes a strong incentive to
 
discriminate.  Evidence suggests that nursing homes that can attract
 
private pay patients do discriminate, regardless of ownership type.
 
In fact, contrary to what one would expect, non-profit homes seem to
 
have the highest ratio of private pay patients.  Gottesman (1974) and
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Vladeck (1980) found a lower than average medicaid utilization rate in
 
non-profit homes (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).
 
This may support the Kane and Kane (1980c) argument that it is
 
not ownership type that is the crucial question, but rather resource
 
availability.  With more private pay patients in non-profit nursing
 
homes than in profit nursing homes, non-profit homes have access to
 
more revenue and thus are able to afford to deliver a higher quality
 
of care, as shown in higher expenditures on direct patient care.
 
Hawes and Phillips (1985) found several of the major nursing
 
home chains homes to be similar to non-profit homes in that they have
 
a relatively low medicaid utilization rate.  Many of these chains have
 
used a deliberate strategy to reduce medicaid utilization.  The most
 
aggressive chain in this pursuit is Manor Care, who in the late 1970's
 
attempted to evict medicaid individuals.  More recently, Manor Care
 
has targeted it acquisitions towards facilities which already have a
 
high private pay utilization, and sold facilities with high medicaid
 
utilization (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).
 
The difference in revenues generated from private and public pay
 
patients not only leads to discrimination against medicaid patients,
 
but also between medicaid patients.  The cause of the first type of
 
discrimination is fairly obvious.  If there is a consumer who is able
 
to pay more for a service, most producers prefer to do business with
 
that individual.  The second form of discrimination is more subtle.
 
If you are going to be reimbursed a fixed amount for two patients,
 
then in choosing between the two, the one who uses the least resources
 
is most attractive.  This creates a severe access to care problem for
 
the heavy care medicaid patients.
 
The following are a few examples of the discrimination faced by
 
medicaid patients:  many nursing homes maintain separate waiting lists
 
for private pay patients and medicaid patients; some homes require
 
patients to sign contracts upon entering facilities which guarantee
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they will be private pay patients for a fixed time period; other homes
 
have evicted medicaid patients in order to free up their bed for a
 
private pay patient (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).  In terms of the heavy
 
care patient, there are numerous documented cases of patients "backed
 
up" in hospitals awaiting nursing home placement, while there are
 
empty nursing home beds in the community (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).
 
Discrimination based on payment source has lead to a dual market
 
in both supply and demand.  The result is that medicaid patients are
 
considered potential consumers only after private demand at market
 
price has been satisfied.  Health planning limitations and certificate
 
of need (CON) legislation has created a shortage of nursing home beds
 
(the average occupancy rate is 95%).  This has lead to a dual market
 
in supply, in that it allows substandard homes (which cannot attract
 
private pay patients) to remain in existence as they are often
 
medicaid patient's only choice (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).
 
Schenker's (1984) research supports the existence of
 
discrimination and its relationship to quality of care, notably higher
 
quality care is associated with both a lower share of medicaid
 
patients and a lower occupancy rate (Hawes and Phillips, 1986).  The
 
lower occupancy rate follows in that it shows discrimination against
 
medicaid patients who, as discussed above, tend to have a negative
 
impact on quality.
 
Birnbaum et al. (1981), in their review of eleven econometric
 
cost studies, approach the source of payment issue from the
 
perspective of payment source as a product descriptor.  This is only
 
valid if patients' need or care vary systematically by payment source
 
and if the systematic difference has not already been accounted for in
 
the analysis.  The authors focus on how source of payment affects
 
cost.  They present two alternative hypothesis, the first is that
 
private pay patients will demand more amenities and will generate
 
higher costs.  The second hypothesis is that, as private pay patients
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are paying for services out of their own pocket, versus the government
 
subsidized public patients, private pay demand would be more sensitive
 
to price.  Thus facilities primarily serving private pay clientele
 
will have lower costs (Birnbaum et al., 1981; Palmer, 1983).
 
The findings on the effect payment source has on cost differs
 
across studies.  In a study which used data from Massachusetts, per
 
diem costs were lower in homes which were primarily public pay
 
patients (Birnbaum et al., 1981).  Another study which used data from
 
New York, found the opposite the result (Birnbaum et al., 1981).  In a
 
study using national data, payment source was not found to have a
 
statistically significant impact on cost.  This could result from the
 
averaging of regional differences (Birnbaum et al, 1981; Palmer,1983).
 
Is Patient Mix Different Among Ownership Type Based on Assistance With
 
Activities of Daily Living?
 
In using cost figures to infer quality, it is important to
 
account for intensity of case mix between facilities.  However, there
 
is no single, generally accepted, measure which captures a facility's
 
case mix and allows comparisons between facilities.
 
One measure of functional dependency is whether patients are in
 
a Skilled Nursing Facilities, (SNF) or a Intermediate Care Facilities
 
(ICF).  Generally, patients in SNF's require a higher level of care.
 
However, a problem arises with this classification scheme when using
 
national data, because states differ in defining which patients are to
 
be treated in SNF's and ICF's.  Thus it is possible that the same
 
patient could be placed in a skilled nursing facility in one state and
 
an intermediate care facility in another (Birnbaum et al, 1981;
 
Meiners, 1982). In addition, the cost differences between SNFs and
 
ICFs may in fact be a reflection of the impact of different state
 
regulation and reimbursement schedules rather than patient need
 
(Palmer, 1983).  Since federal guidelines use this classification
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distinction for rate setting, it is likely that cost differences
 
between the two groups will be reinforced by the grouping.
 
The preferred method of assessing case mix is to measure the
 
functional dependency of patients by using patients' need for
 
assistance with activities of daily living, (ADL).  The expectation is
 
that, as a patient's functional dependency increases, the cost of
 
providing service to that individual should show a corresponding
 
increase.
 
Gertler and Waldman (1992) use an ADL system, based on Katz's
 
(1970) activity of daily living scheme, to classify patients in a case
 
mix index.  Case mix is identified as an exogenous determinant of
 
demand, versus the more common use in existing literature, as a
 
product descriptor.  Katz's scheme consists of six activities
 
performed in daily life.  The activities range from bathing and
 
dressing to transferring (movement), eating and toileting.  Functional
 
dependency increases as patient's need for assistance in these
 
categories increases.  Gertler and Waldman use the average ADL score
 
as the indicator of case mix intensity and find it to have a positive
 
effect on demand.
 
Meiners (1982) uses ADL as a patient descriptor in estimating a
 
cost function for nursing homes.  He uses data from the 1973-1974
 
National Nursing Home Survey, an earlier version of the data that will
 
be used in this study.  Meiners finds conditional support for the
 
hypothesis that functionally dependent patients require more
 
assistance, thus cost more.  His results indicate that as functional
 
dependence increases, residents are more costly to treat, with the
 
exception of those who are fully dependent.  Skinner and Yett (1973)
 
explain this apparent paradox, by noting fully dependent patients are
 
neither seriously ill nor capable of being rehabilitated.  Therefore
 
they are more likely to require a lower level of care, which consists
 
of occasional checking of vital signs and routine personal care.
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Shaughnessy's (1980) research of Colorado nursing homes support
 
Meiner's findings.
 
Birnbaum et al. (1981), provides an overview of eleven
 
econometric cost studies on twenty sets of nursing home data.  The use
 
of ADL as a product descriptor, did not add significant explanatory
 
power to the model using national data.  However, the measures of ADL
 
using New York data, were found to have significant explanatory power
 
in explaining cost differences.  The New York study controlled for
 
quality and thus lends support to the hypothesis that it is more
 
costly to care for functionally dependent persons.
 
Liu and Mossey (1980) and Schlenker and Shaughnessy (1984) find
 
that private pay patients tend to be more functionally dependent than
 
medicaid patients.  If non-profit homes have a higher ratio of private
 
pay patients, then one would expect their case mix to be more acute
 
(Hawes and Phillips, 1986).  If nonprofit homes have a more intense
 
case mix, it would be incorrect to claim that non-profit nursing homes
 
offer a higher quality of care based solely on the differences in
 
direct patient care expenditures.  Several studies use regression
 
analysis to control for differing patient case mix and results
 
indicate that patient mix does indeed account for some, but not all,
 
of the cost difference between profit and non-profit nursing homes
 
(Hawes and Phillips, 1986).
 
Thus even when case mix is controlled for, non-profit homes are
 
found to spend more on direct patient care.  This supports the earlier
 
argument that non-profits offer a higher quality of care.  Some argue,
 
that instead of a quality, the cost differential reflects a difference
 
in the efficiency of profit and non-profit nursing homes.  The
 
incentive for profit may encourage proprietary homes to produce a
 
similar output using fewer inputs than their non-profit counterparts,
 
resulting in lower cost (Birnbaum et al, 1981).
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Do Non-Profit Nursing Homes Have a More Charitable Wage Policy Than
 
Their Proprietary Counterparts?
 
In estimating per patient day expenditures, the majority of
 
studies have found that non-profit homes have higher average daily
 
expenditures than do their proprietary counterparts.  As a possible
 
explanation for this cost difference, Feldstein (1988) and Palmer
 
(1983) theorizes that non-profit homes have a more philanthropic wage
 
policy than do profit nursing homes.
 
It is interesting to note that most studies focus on issues
 
surrounding efficiency when explaining the cost difference rather than
 
examining wage policy.  Frech (1985), however, explicitly addressed
 
this issue, citing three different reasons why a non-profit nursing
 
home would pay its workers more.  Borjas (1980) suggests that non­
profit operators pay their workers more to ensure worker cooperation
 
in pursuing nonpecuniary goals.  Feldstein (1988) reasons that owners
 
spend economic rent and overpay their workers as a charitable act.
 
Finally, owners may not be as aware of labor markets prices due to
 
attenuated property rights, therefore they consistently make errors in
 
wage offerings.  As only the offers which exceed the workers
 
reservation wage will be excepted, the observable error will be on the
 
positive side of the worker's reservation wage resulting in a higher
 
wage for the worker.
 
Based on the results of regression analysis, Frech (1985)
 
concludes that the difference in wages is too small to account for the
 
five to twenty-nine percent difference in costs between non-profit and
 
profit nursing homes.
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CHAPTER III
 
DATA
 
The data used to evaluate the three themes are from the National
 
Nursing Home Survey of 1985.  Four questionnaires are used: Facility
 
Questionnaire, Nursing Staff Questionnaire, Current Resident
 
Questionnaire, and the Expense Questionnaire.
 
The sampling universe consisted of 20,479 nursing homes (to be
 
included, the nursing home must provide some level of nursing care).
 
"The sampling procedure yielded a nationally representative sample of
 
1,220 nursing and related care homes" (U.S. Dept., 1991 page V).  Of
 
the 1,220 homes, 84 refused to participate, and 57 were out of scope,
 
thus leaving 1,079 remaining in the sample (U.S. Dept., 1991). Because
 
the information contained in the expense questionnaire is the basis of
 
the analysis performed in this paper, its limited response rate of 68%
 
restricts the data set to a maximum of 731 observations.
 
A two-stage probability sampling design was used.  In the first
 
stage a selection of facilities took place and in the second stage a
 
selection of residents, discharges, and registered nurses were chosen
 
from the sample facilities selected in the first stage.  In the second
 
stage, five or fewer residents per facility were selected for the
 
sample and a maximum of four registered nurses per facility were
 
selected (U.S. Dept., 1991).
 
The information relevant to the questions addressed in the
 
Facility Questionnaire is as follows: type of ownership, whether the
 
facility a member of a group, number of facilities in the
 
organization, beds currently available for residents, number of beds
 
licensed by the health department, certification status with medicare/
 
medicaid, number of beds certified for medicare, medicare per diem
 
rate, medicaid SNF program, number of certified SNF medicaid beds,
 
medicaid SNF per diem rate, medicaid ICF program, number of medicaid
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ICF beds, medicaid ICF per diem rate, basic charge for private pay
 
patients SNF and ICF and residential, number of noncertified beds,
 
facility admissions for 1984, facility discharges for 1984, number of
 
patient deaths for 1984, total SNF medicare inpatient days, total SNF
 
medicaid inpatient days, total ICF medicaid inpatient days, all other
 
inpatient days, total days, number of nonresidents receiving care,
 
information on full/part time employees (ranges from RN's, pharmacists
 
to food service personnel), a dummy variable on metropolitan status,
 
geographic region (north east, north central, south and west).
 
Although there is a lot of information contained in the facility
 
questionnaire, there are some data limitations.  For example, the
 
variable expressing number of beds certified as medicaid/medicare is
 
coded with a 300 bed limit, (i.e. all facilities with beds over this
 
amount are recorded as having 300).  The same is true with patient
 
days, the maximum amount that is possible to record is 100,000.  The
 
information contained in the facility report will be used mainly when
 
addressing the issue of case mix based on source of payment, and to
 
classify facilities according to ownership type.
 
The Nursing Staff questionnaire contains the following items:
 
years worked at particular facility, involvement in staff education
 
activities, involvement in planning or participating in research, the
 
importance of how well the facility is equipped in recruiting and
 
retaining employee's, year graduated and education obtained, a dummy
 
variable for geriatric training, participation in various workshops
 
for the aged, metropolitan status (dummy).  This information has
 
potential quality of care implications if the characteristics of the
 
nursing staff are sufficiently different by ownership type.  For
 
instance, one could argue that specialized training leads to care
 
which is more receptive to the needs of the elderly population, thus
 
is a higher quality of care.  The education and experience information
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will help determine if wage differences reflect "real"  differences or
 
are more of a function of ownership type.
 
The Current Resident questionnaire provides the  following:
 
resident's residence before entering the facility, was resident living
 
alone, with family, or nonfamily, Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG)
 
classification, ADL information (dummy), physical and mental health
 
rating (scale of excellent,  good, fair, poor), primary source of
 
payment, total charge billed for last month.  This information will
 
assist in determining case mix in terms of both payment source and ADL
 
measure.
 
An additional comparison could be made based on the mental and
 
However, there are several potential problems
 physical health scale.
 
It is basically a normative judgement call by a

with this measure.
 
member of the nursing staff familiar with the patient's care,
 
therefore ratings may not be consistent across facilities.
 
nursing staff
 The expense questionnaire contains the following:
 
payroll expenses, physician and other professional and  semi­
professional payroll expenses, all other staff wages and salaries,
 
benefits, expenditures on health care
 payroll taxes and fringe
 
services from outside the  facility, rent on equipment, buildings and
 
land, depreciation, food and other dietary items expenses,  drug
 
expenses, supplies and equipment expenses, purchased maintenance,
 
purchased laundry services, utilities, total expenses, patient  care
 
revenues, public payments-medicaid, public payment-medicare, private
 
From this information,
 payments, nonpatient revenues,  total revenues.
 
direct patient care expenditures as well as average total expenditures
 
should be able to be estimated.
 
Although the data may be broken down by regions, which are
 
identical to that used by the census department, this breakdown is too
 
geographical effects, in that an
 general to isolate any specific
 
averaging out of regional effects may still take place.  In addition,
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as the state which the facility resides in is not given, for reasons
 
of confidentiality, it is impossible to determine the effect of state
 
regulation on costs.
 
Another concern with the data in the expense questionnaire comes
 
from the fact that the data is self reported.  If the data were
 
collected in different ways and if different items were included in
 
the cost pools, then comparisons based on the data may not be
 
accurate.  However, it appears that the expense categories were
 
defined broad enough to avoid this problem.
 
Both Birnbaum et al. (1981) and Meiners (1982), using earlier
 
versions of the National Nursing Home Survey, discuss some of the
 
weaknesses in the survey data.  For these authors, the most troubling
 
aspect of the data is that when dealing with information from the
 
Nursing Questionnaire and/or the Current Resident Questionnaire, one
 
is forced to make generalizations about the characteristics of the
 
homes population based on a very small, potentially unrepresentative
 
sample.
 
Birnbaum states in a footnote that because patient information
 
was based on sample data, the corresponding variables were subject to
 
considerable error leading to a bias in the coefficients in the cost
 
function toward zero.  Meiners qualifies the results of the cost
 
function estimates by stating the estimates reliability may be
 
hindered because for some facilities probably too small a sample was
 
taken to be a reliable indicator of the relationship between patient
 
characteristic and costs.
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CHAPTER IV
 
MODELS
 
Theme One: Expenditures on Direct Patient Care
 
To examine differences in direct care expenditures a short run
 
cost function is estimated.  Economic theory suggests that costs are a
 
function of input prices (w), output (y) and, in the short run,
 
capacity (z).  Therefore the cost function is  C = c(w,y,z) (Varian
 
1984).  However, as Silverburg (1990) points out, the above function
 
depends upon behavioral assertions concerning firm behavior (i.e. the
 
cost function is dependent on the objectives of the firm.)  Silverburg
 
discusses how even firms with identical production functions could
 
have different cost functions if they have different property rights.
 
Examination of the literature on nursing home costs, indicates
 
that costs are also a function of facility characteristics and patient
 
characteristics.  Therefore, the estimated cost equation will include
 
factor inputs, capacity and facility an patient characteristics.  The
 
output measure is total patient days (tdays) and total patient days
 
squared (tdays2), capacity is the occupancy rate (occr) and input
 
prices are defined as:
 
rnwage - average weekly salary,
 
prowag - physicians,other professional and semi professional
 
yearly gross pay,
 
nsfwag - nursing staff wages-yearly compensation to those who
 
administer nursing care,
 
othwag - yearly wage given to employees not specified above,
 
The facility characteristics are non-profit (np), chain profit
 
(cp), chain non-profit (cnonp) and total services offered (tserv). Two
 
patient characteristics are used ADL, a measure of average need for
 
assistance with activities of daily living, and percent of the
 
patients who are private pay,(perpriv).
 21 
Other factors considered include:  Metropolitan status and the
 
region where the nursing home is located.  The west is the reference
 
point, R1 represents the northeast, R2 the north central and R3 the
 
south.
 
The dependent variable is expenditures relating to direct
 
patient care, rather than total expenditures.  There are several
 
reasons for this.  First, in order to estimate a cost function input
 
prices are needed and it is not possible to calculate input prices for
 
plant and equipment, rent, and interest expense.  Second, depreciation
 
and amortization expenses came from self reported data which may not
 
be comparable.
 
Two models will be estimated, an unrestricted and a restricted
 
model.  In the unrestricted model all of the relevant independent
 
variables will be interacted with a dummy variable which accounts for
 
ownership status.  This will allow for the possible effect, of
 
different firm objectives to be reflected in the cost function.
 
Profit nursing homes will be the reference category.  A restricted
 
model, one which forces constant marginal effects across ownership
 
classifications, will be estimated and compared to the unrestricted
 
model.
 
It is hypothesized that percent private maybe endogenous.  If
 
endogeneity is present, then the assumption of a zero covariance
 
between the error term and the independent variables, percent private
 
is broken.  This leads to biased and inconsistent estimators (Kelejian
 
and Oates 1981, Pindyck and Rubenfeld 1991).  To correct this problem,
 
an instrument for the variable percent private is constructed by
 
regressing all exogenous variables in the system on percent private,
 
and obtaining the predicted values to use as an instrument.  Since the
 
variable percent private in the unrestricted model is interacted with
 
a dummy variable, accounting for ownership classification, the
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instrumental variables for percent private will have to be constructed
 
separately for the four ownership classifications.
 
The Hausman test, as specified in Kennedy (1992 page 169) is
 
used to test for exogeneity.  The test consists of obtaining the
 
predicted values of percent private and including them in the original
 
equation to be estimated.  Note both the predicted values and the
 
original values of percent private are used in the regression.
 
Endogeneity is indicated if through an F test, the coefficients on the
 
predicted variables, are found significantly different from zero.  In
 
this study, endogeneity is found to be present and the two stage least
 
squares (2sls) estimation technique is used, for the unrestricted
 
model but for the restricted model.  The two models are as follows:
 
Unrestricted:
 
expenditures=a, +ccAv+apep  + prRNwage +132RNwageDnp +
 
p3RNwageDmIp +13412NwageDcp + p5prowage +peprowageDnp +p,prowageDm, +
 
f38orowageD,p+posfwag +pnnsfwagDnp +pnnsfwagDmv,+
 
pnrmffivacpep + p13othwag + p14othwagDnp +13 15othwagDcm, +  p16othwag +
 
pntdays + pi,tdaysDnp + pi,tdaysDanp + p 20 tdaySpcp + p21tdays2 +
 
p22tdays2np + p23tdays2p + ,- B2 4tdays2cp + p25perpriv + p26oerprivDcp +
 
pnperprivDmv + p28perprivDcp + [329avedl + pnaveadlDnp + p,laveadlDp +
 
p32aveadlDcp + p33tsoff + p34tsoffDnp + 1335tsoffDp + p36tsoffDcp +
 
pnoccr + p38occrDni, + p39occrDp + p40occrDep +
 
+ E
  1341R1 + Pa2R2 + /343R3 + p44metro 
perpriv = ea + errnwage + 62proway + 63nsfwag + e4thwag + 65tdays + 
86tday2 +67aveadl + eatsery + 89R1  610R2 
enmetro  enoccr  el,rnhr + 015adhr + e 611R3 
Restricted
 
expenditures =a1 + a2Dnp + a(3)D,p + a4Dcp + piRNwage + p2prowage + 
p3nsfwag + p4othwag + pstdays + p6tdays2 + p7perpriv + Naveadl +
p9tsoff + piooccr  P13R3 + p14metro + P11R1  P12R2 
perpriv = ea + eirnwage + 62proway  + 03nsfwag + 04thwag + 495tdays +
 
86tday2 +67aveadl + 08tsery + 09R1  010R2
 
011R3 + eignetro + enoccr + eisirnhr + e15adhr + e
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Since endogeneity is present for one of the models, the
 
instruments discussed above, are substituted in the estimation
 
equation for the original variable.  The second stage of 2SLS consists
 
of estimating the equation using OLS.  Note, although the correct
 
coefficient estimates are obtained though this procedure, the
 
associated standard errors are not.  To correct for this the standard
 
errors must be multiplied by the following ratio (Maddala, 1992):
 
5o18.251s. 
Where the numerator is the standard deviation of the error term from
 
the original model (i.e. the model without the instrument), estimated
 
with the coefficients from the second stage of 2SLS and the
 
denominator is the standard deviation of the error term obtained from
 
the 2SLS model (i.e. the model which uses the instrument).
 
As discussed in the data section, patient days and number of
 
licensed beds are truncated at 100,000 days and 300 beds.  This leads
 
to a potential error in variables problem, which could lead to biased
 
and inconsistent estimators.  A possible solution to this problem is
 
to drop the observations with the truncated variables.  However, a
 
danger in doing this is that the dropped observations are not dropped
 
randomly.  They represent data from the largest nursing homes in the
 
sample and dropping them may introduce a bias of its own.
 
The following table shows the expected signs of the coefficients
 
in the unrestricted and restricted model:
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Table 1.  Cost function expected coefficient signs.
 
UNRESTRICTED	  RESTRICTED
 
Variable  Profit	  Non  Profit  Non Profit
 
Profit  Chain  Chain
 
INPUT PRICES
 
+ + + +  +
 rnwage
 
+ + + +  +
 prowag
 
+ + + +  +
 nsfwag
 
othwag	  + + + +  +
 
OUTPUT
 
+ + + +	  +
 tdays
 
tdays2	  + +  + +  +
 
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
 
percent  ?  ?  ? ?  ?
 
private
 
+ + +	 +  +
 adl
 
FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS
 
ownership  ref  +  ?  ?
 
classification
 
tsery
  + + + +	  +
 
CAPACITY
 
occupancy rate  +  +  +  +	  +
 
The expected signs for input prices are fairly straightforward:
 
an increase in input price is expected to increase cost.  The sign for
 
the output coefficient, tdays, is  expected to be positive because as
 
most nursing homes operate at near capacity (95%).
 
The only predictable sign for the patient characteristic
 
variables is ADL.  The literature indicates that, unless a patient is
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fully dependent, an increased need in assistance in ADL corresponds to
 
an increase in the cost of care (Mieners 1982; Skinner and Yett 1978).
 
As the majority of nursing home residents are not fully dependent,
 
this coefficient is predicted to be positive.  The sign for percent
 
private is an empirical question.  As discussed in the literature
 
review, there are two alternative hypothesis on the effect percent
 
private has on costs.
 
The sign on tsery is expected to be positive.  For ownership
 
classification, as profit is the reference point, nonp (dummy for
 
nonprofit status) is expected to be positive as profit homes
 
traditionally have lower costs (McKay, 1991; Palmer, 1983; Hawes and
 
Phillips, 1986).  CP (dummy for chain profit) will be negative if
 
economies of scale are present (McKay's (1991) work showed this to be
 
dependent on output level).  The sign for CNONP (dummy for chain
 
nonprofit) is uncertain as there are two potential opposing forces
 
affecting this variable: the possible cost savings from chain
 
affiliation, versus the positive impact of nonprofit ownership status.
 
The sign for the capacity coefficient, occr, could either be
 
positive or negative, depending on how close a home is to full
 
capacity.  One would initially expect to see cost savings as occupancy
 
rate is increased because the cost of the fixed factors of production
 
are being spread over more output.  However at some point further
 
increases in capacity will result in the fixed factors being over
 
utilized and this "congestion" effect will lead to higher costs.
 
Since, the average occupancy rate for nursing homes is high, around 95
 
percent, further increases in capacity are expected to result in
 
higher costs.
 
Theme Two: Differing Patient Mix
 
The procedure used to test the hypothesis concerning differing
 
patient mix among ownership type, is analysis of variance (ANOVA).
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The data is from the current resident questionnaire which has a
 
response rate significantly larger than the expense questionnaire, 965
 
responses compared to 647.  Although the information in the expense
 
questionnaire is the basis of later analysis, to investigate the
 
possibility of this loss of information introducing bias into the
 
analysis, ANOVA was used on two different samples.  The first sample,
 
called the unrestricted sample, includes all the observations in the
 
current resident questionnaire.  The second, the restricted sample,
 
includes only the observations in the current resident questionnaire
 
which are also in the expense questionnaire.  The Bonferroni
 
comparison method was used, with an experiment wise error of five
 
percent.
 
Table 2 shows the number of facilities by ownership
 
classification in both the unrestricted and the restricted samples.
 
The decrease in sample size is higher in the Profit and Chain Profit
 
ownership classifications.  In percent terms the decrease in sample
 
size is Profit (39.2%) and Chain Profit (41.3%) compared to Non-Profit
 
(8.9%) and Chain Non-Profit (11.4%).  The possibility of the two
 
samples giving  different ANOVA results will be investigated.
 
Table  .  Theme two sample size information.
 
OWNERSHIP  UNRESTRICTED  RESTRICTED
 
CLASSIFICATION  SAMPLE  (965)*  SAMPLE  (647)**
 
1. Non-Profit  158  144
 
2. Profit  273  166
 
3. Chain Profit  455  267
 
70
 4. Chain Non-Profit  79
 
* Due to missing values,  965 observations out of a possible 1078 were
 
used in the analysis.
 
** Due to missing values,  647 observations out of a possible 731 were
 
used in the analysis.
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Theme Three: Charitable Wage Policies
 
The third theme investigates whether or not non-profit nursing
 
homes have a more philanthropic wage policy than their proprietary
 
counterparts.  The data contains extensive information on the
 
registered nurses salary and characteristics.  Accordingly, the focus
 
of this investigation will be on the wages received by registered
 
nurses.
 
The issue of quality of care is an underlying theme in this
 
section.  If it is true that nonprofit institutions pay higher wages
 
than their proprietary counterparts, it could be due to either a
 
philanthropic wage policy or a difference in the education and
 
training of their RNs which justify a higher wage and has implications
 
for quality of care delivered.
 
This analysis will use two models to examine average RN wage.
 
In the first model, the restricted model, average RN wage is a
 
function of ownership type and group of background variables which
 
describe the education and training of the RN's.  The background
 
variables will be described below.  The unrestricted model is
 
identical to the restricted model except that the variables describing
 
education and training are interacted with dummy variables which
 
account for ownership status.  The reference category for ownership
 
classification will be profit institutions.
 
Restricted
 
RNwage=a,+a213,,p+app+a4Dop+y,atted+y,resrch
 
+wwsnca+yiwsmca+yocmnpa+ynwsnuta +yn wsph arm
 
+y,,wsact+yngeried +y"ms ger+y15exp
 
+y./2/ +yr,R2 +y103 +yi,metro+6
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Unrestricted
 
RNwage=al+a2Dnp+a,Dp+a4Dep+y,atted+y2attedDnp 
+y3attedDp+y4attedDcpy5resrch+y6resrchDnp+y7resrchDenp 
+y8resrchDcp+y9wsnca+ywsncaD +ynwsncaDmv+1112wsncapcp lo 
+y13wzmca+y1 awsincaDnp+y15tismcaDenp+y16wsmcaDcpy17wsmspa+ 
Y18wsnisPaDnp+Y19wsosPaDanp#Y2owsmsPapcp+y21wsnutay22wsnutaDnp 
+y-23wsnutaDmm+y2,wsnutaDapy25wspharm+y26wsphannDnp+y27wspharrnDp
 
'613wspharmDcp-i-y29wsact+y30wsactDnp+y31wsactDcnp+y32wsactDcp

+y33geried+y34geriec/Dnp+y35geriedDmT4-Y36geriedDep+y37msger
 
+y38msgerDnp+y39znsgerD,p+y4onisgerDcp+y41 exp+y42expDnp+
 
yexpDcnp+y44expDcp+y45R1 +yR2+y47.1R3+

ymetro+E
 
The dependent variable is average RN weekly wages.
 
Unfortunately fringe benefits and bonuses are not included in this
 
figure.  The background variables are facility averages, based on the
 
responses from the Nursing Staff Questionnaire and are defined as
 
follows:
 
atted ­ percent of R.N.'s involved in attending staff education 
activities, 
resch ­ percent of R.N.'s involved in planning/participating in 
research, 
gered ­ percent of R.N.'s who participated in a geriatric nurse  1 
practitioner preparation program, 
msger ­ percent of R.N.'s who possess a master's specializing in 
geriatric nursing practices, 
wnca - percent of R.N.'s who completed a workshop on nursing care of
 
the aged,
 
wmca  percent of R.N.'s who attended a workshop on the medical care
 
of the aged,
 
wmspa - percent of R.N.'s who participated in a workshop on the
 
mental/social problems of the aged,
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wnuta - percent of R.N.'s who completed a workshop on nutrition and
 
the aged,
 
wphar - percent of R.N.'s who attended a workshop on pharmacology and
 
the aged,
 
wsact - percent of R.N.'s who participated in a workshop on activity
 
programs for the aged,
 
rnexp - average number of years, since graduation, that the R.N.'s
 
have worked for pay,
 
R1 - northeast region, R2 - north central region, R3 - south
 
region,  (West is the reference point).
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Table 3.  RN wage expected coefficient signs.
 
UNRESTRICTED  RESTRICTED
 
Profit  Non  Profit  Non
 
Variable  Profit  Chain  Profit
 
Chain
 
R.N. CHARACTERISTICS
 
ATTED  + + + +  +
 
RESCH  +
  + + +  +
 
+ +
 
MSGER  + + + +  +
 
WNCA  + + +  +
 
GERED +  +  +
 
+
 
+ +
 
WMSPA  + + + +  +
 
WNUTA  + + + +  +
 
WPHAR  +  +
 
WMCA  +  + +
 
+ +  +
 
WSACT  + + + +  +
 
RNEXP
  + + + +  +
 
NONP +  +
 
CNONP  ?
 
CP
 
Predicting the signs of the coefficients for the variables
 
representing the level of education and training follows human capital
 
theory: education and job specific training should result in higher
 
wages.
 
If the hypothesis of nonprofit institutions having a more
 
philanthropic wage policy is true, then one would expect NONP to be
 
positive.  It is harder to predict the sign for CNONP because it has
 
two potential, opposing, effects.  On the positive side, there is its
 
nonprofit classification, on the negative side is its chain
 
affiliation which could result in more purchasing power than single
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standing facilities.  The sign on CNONP is therefore and empirical
 
question.  Based on possible purchasing power advantages over single
 
standing facilities, the sign for CP is predicted as negative.
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CHAPTER V
 
RESULTS
 
The results of theme two, differing patient mix, will be
 
discussed first and will be followed by themes one and three
 
respectively.
 
Theme Two: Differing Patient Mix
 
Using source of payment as a proxy for patient mix ANOVA is
 
performed on four groups; percent private pay patients, percent public
 
pay patients, percent of patients which the facility itself paid for,
 
and percent of patients whose payment source could not be identified.
 
The data were divided into four categories for sake of completeness.
 
However the focus of this analysis was on private and public pay
 
patients.  No information was lost in focusing on these two groups as
 
the ownership classifications were found not to differ in the other
 
categories.
 
Tables 4 and 5 present the ANOVA results for private and public
 
pay patients respectively.  With a few exceptions the results support
 
conclusions from the literature review.  The percentage of private pay
 
patients is found to differ by ownership classification.  The
 
ownership classification which shows the highest percentage of private
 
pay patients is Non-Profit Chain (57.9%), followed by Non-Profit homes
 
(56.2%), but the difference is not statistically significant.
 
However, the percent of private pay patients for Non-Profit and Chain
 
Non-Profit homes is significantly different from that of Profits and
 
Chain Profits.  These findings hold for both samples.
 
In contrast to Hawes and Phillips (1985), Profit homes were
 
found to have higher percentages of private pay patients (45.6%), than
 
Chain Profit homes (38.4%).
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Sample size becomes important when analyzing the differences
 
among ownership classification for Profit and Chain Profit homes.
 
When the unrestricted sample is used both Profit and Chain Profit
 
homes are significantly different (at the 5% level) from each other
 
and the two Non-Profit classifications.  However when the restricted
 
sample is used, the findings indicate that Profit and Chain Profit are
 
only significantly different from the Non-Profit classifications.
 
Table 4.  Payment source (percent private).
 
Ho:The percentage of private pay patients are the same amongst ownership classification.
 
UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE  RESTRICTED SAMPLE
 
reject or accept Ho.	  reject  reject
 
(.0001)  (.0001)
 
P-Value  P-Value
 
OWNERSHIP  DIFFERENCES  DIFFERENCES
 
CLASSIFICATION
  SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5% LEVEL  SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5% LEVEL
 
1. Non-Profit	  Profit,  Profit,
 
Chain Profit,  Chain Profit,
 
(percent private 56.2)  (percent private 56.2)
 
2. Profit	  Non-Profit,  Non-Profit,
 
Chain Profit,  Chain Non-Profit,
 
Chain Non-Profit,  (percent private 44.8)
 
(percent private 45.6)
 
3. Chain Profit	  Non-Profit,  Non-Profit,
 
Profit,  Chain Non-Profit,
 
Chain Non-Profit,  (percent private 36.8)
 
(percent private 38.4)
 
4. Chain Non-Profit	  Profit,  Profit,
 
Chain Profit,  Chain Profit,
 
(percent private 57.9)  (percent private 57.6)
 
As seen in Table 5 the results for public pay patients mirror
 
that of the private pay patients.  The hypotheses of ownership
 
classifications having the same percentage public pay patients is not
 
supported for either sample.
 
The findings on Chain Non-Profit homes are consistent with the
 
expectation that chain homes have low public use patterns.  Non-Profit
 
Chain homes had the lowest percent of public patients, 34.1 percent in
 
the unrestricted sample and 33.9 percent in the restricted sample.
 
However, the findings on Chain Profit homes are contrary to what the
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literature suggests showing the highest public patient utilization
 
rate, 52 and 53.9 percent in the unrestricted and restricted samples.
 
Non-Profit homes had the second lowest public pay utilization rate,
 
35.9 percent in the unrestricted sample and 36 percent in the
 
restricted sample.  In both samples, Non-Profit and Chain Non-Profit
 
homes were not significantly different from one another, but were
 
significantly different from their proprietary counterparts.
 
These findings suggest that Non-Profit homes are more aggressive
 
than Profit Chains in attracting private pay patients, or as suggested
 
in the literature this difference could reflect a difference in the
 
quality of care between the two institutions.  This will be addressed
 
later in the paper.
 
In the unrestricted sample Profit and Chain Profit homes were
 
significantly different from one another as well as from Chain Non-

Profit and Non-Profit homes.  However in the restricted sample they
 
were significantly different from only the Non-Profit homes.
 
Table 5.  Payment source (percent public).
 
Ho: The percentage of public pay patients are the same amongst ownership
 
classification.
 
UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE  RESTRICTED SAMPLE
 
reject or accept Ho.	  reject  reject
 
(.0001)  (.0001)
 
P-Value  P-Value
 
OWNERSHIP  DIFFERENCES  DIFFERENCES
 
CLASSIFICATION
  SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5% LEVEL	  SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5%
 
LEVEL
 
1. Non-Profit	  Profit,  Profit,
 
Chain Profit,  Chain Profit,
 
(percent public 35.9)  (percent public 36.)
 
2. Profit	  Non-Profit,  Non-Profit,
 
Chain Profit,  Chain Non-Profit,
 
Chain Non-Profit,
 
(percent public 47.0)  (percent public 47.8)
 
Non-Profit,
 
Profit,  Chain Non-Profit,
 
Chain Non-Profit,
 
(percent public 52.0)  (percent public 53.9)
 
3. Chain Profit	  Non-Profit,
 
Profit,
 
Chain Profit,  Chain Profit,
 
(percent public 34.1)  (percent public 33.9)
 
4. Chain Non-Profit  Profit,
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The results for the second patient mix criteria, ADL, are shown
 
in Table 6.  An ADL average is calculated for each individual
 
represented in the current resident questionnaire.  The ANOVA results
 
fail to support the findings of existing literature and were very
 
sensitive to sample size.
 
The hypothesis of an equal ADL score among ownership types was
 
not supported in the unrestricted sample, but was in the restricted
 
sample.  The only difference in ADL scores found to be significant at
 
the 5 percent level in the unrestricted sample was the difference
 
between Chain Profit and Profit institutions.
 
Several studies have found private pay patients to be more
 
functionally dependent than public patients.  If this is the case,
 
higher average ADL scores should be found in facilities which have a
 
higher ratio of private pay patients.  Based on this argument and the
 
information contained in Table 4 one would expect the ownership
 
classification with the highest ADL score would be Chain Non-Profit,
 
then Non-Profit, followed by Profit, with Chain Profit having the
 
lowest score.
 
However, the findings of this analysis do not adhere to
 
expectations.  The Chain Profit classification, which had the highest
 
average ADL had the lowest percent private patients.  Chain Non-Profit
 
was second, followed by Non-Profit, with Profit homes having the
 
lowest average ADL.  However, the only ownership classifications which
 
were found significantly different from one another were Chain Profit
 
and Profit.
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Table 6.  Activities of daily living.
 
Ho: The average assistance in ADL is the same amongst ownership classification.
 
I
 UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE  RESTRICTED SAMPLE
 
reject or accept Ho.	  reject  accept
 
(.029).  (.4753)
 
P-Value  P-Value
 
OWNERSHIP  DIFFERENCES  DIFFERENCES 
CLASSIFICATION  SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5% LEVEL  SIGNIFICANT AT THE 5% 
LEVEL 
1. Non-Profit	  none  none
 
(average ADL 4.08)  (average ADL 4.15)
 
2. Profit	  Chain Profit  none
 
(average ADL 3.95)  (average ADL 4.06)
 
3. Chain Profit	  Profit  none
 
(average ADL 4.26)  (average ADL 4.28)
 
4. Chain Non-profit	  none  none
 
(average ADL 4.23)  (average ADL 4.18)
 
Under both the payment source and ADL criteria, sample size has
 
influenced the ANOVA results.  As discussed above, under the payment
 
criteria sample size influenced differences significant for the Profit
 
and Chain Profit ownership classification.  Under the ADL criteria the
 
outcome of the hypothesis test changed with sample size.  As the
 
expense questionnaire is the basis for the second part of the analysis
 
possible limitations in the data must be kept in mind.
 
Theme One: Expenditures on Direct Patient Care
 
The first issue to be addressed is whether or not the
 
observations containing the truncated variables should be dropped. As
 
can be seen from examining the graph of expenses against total patient
 
days (See Appendix 1), the observations with truncated variables
 
distort the level of expenses at 100,000 patient days.  When we drop
 
these observations we go from a maximum expense value of 22,867,559 to
 
one of 7,985,015.  Due to this large difference and the effect it
 
would have on the estimators, the observations containing the
 
truncated variables were dropped.  Therefore the findings and scope of
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this analysis will be limited to nursing homes with less than 100,000
 
patient days.  As only 48 observations were dropped the effect on
 
sample size is relatively small (601 observations remaining).
 
The next issue to address is whether the variable percent
 
private is endogenous.  The results of the Hausman test on the
 
unrestricted model indicate with a p-value of .047, that percent
 
private is endogenous.  Therefore two-stage least squares is the
 
estimation technique utilized.  The results of the Hausman test on the
 
restricted model indicated percent private was exogenous (prob value
 
for hypothesis of endogeneity was .70).  These results indicate that
 
for the restricted model the correct estimation procedure is OLS.
 
The results for the unrestricted and restricted model can be
 
found in Table 7.  The absolute value of the t-statistic are in
 
parenthesis.
 
Table 7. Cost function:  unrestricted and restricted model results.
 
NON- CHAIN  CHAIN  Restricted
 PROFIT
 
PROFIT  PROFIT  NONPROFIT  Model
 
INPUT PRICES 
RNWAG  1590.02 
(1.89) 
2548.18 
(2.45) 
-364.37 
(.568) 
68.04 
(.052) 
831.83 
(3.25) 
FROWAG  2.15 
(.504) 
19.13 
(3.24) 
7.49 
(1.25) 
10.77 
(1.06) 
7.25 
(3.98) 
NSFWAG  32.03 
(3.32) 
24.36 
(3.09) 
8.75 
(1.61) 
24.53 
(1.72) 
17.15 
(7.14) 
OTHWAG  11.13 
(1.31) 
18.65 
(1.14) 
34.02 
(3.00) 
37.35 
(1.49) 
25.99 
(7.45) 
OUTPUT 
TDAYS  711.26 
(.725) 
8.73 
(.509) 
26.04 
(1.59) 
37.07 
(1.60) 
15.48 
(2.93) 
TDAYS2  .00016 
(1.02) 
.00029 
(1.87) 
-.00003 
(.214) 
-.00008 
(.340) 
.000014 
(2.69) 
PATIENT 
CHARACTERISTICS 
-
HERMIT­ 1,428,380 
(2.01) 
447,086 
(.368) 
1,381,699 
(.979) 
2,271,702 
(1.61) 
-29,038 
(.32) 38 
Table 7.  Continued.
 
NON- CHAIN  CHAIN  Restricted
 PROFIT
 
PROFIT  PROFIT  NONPROFIT  Model
 
AVEADL  58,808  26,068  37,687  239,415  97,801
 
(.789)  ( . 316)  (.657)  (1.68)  (4.5)
 
FACILITY 
CHARACTERISTICS 
TSERV  323,153 
(.836) 
6,710 
(.153) 
-1,984 
(.056) 
83,664 
(1.14) 
20,951 
(1.58) 
CAPACITY
 
OCCR  218,518  -1,886,380  -311,523  -637,224  652,116
 
(4.13)
 (.579)  (2.68)  (.534)  (1.02)
 
INTERCEPT  -2,129,079  975,773 
(2.42)  (3.58) 
NONP  3,022,627  443,075 
(1.59)  (5.66) 
CNONP  869,617 
(.412) 
325,590 
(3.41) 
CP  1,834,820  -37,357 
(1.53)  (.592) 
R1  500,990 
(3.12) 
635,464 
(6.77) 
R2  5489.05  75,464 
(.041)  (.885) 
R3  -47,723  -9,654 
(.341)  (.114) 
METRO  101,335  130,197 
(1.01)  (2.17) 
.7168
 R-square  .796
 
.7071
 Adj R- square  .775
 
* Absolute Value of t-Statistic
 
**In the restricted model the original variable perpriv was used
 
instead of the instrument pperpriv.
 
Input price coefficients for the unrestricted model, with the
 
exception of RNWAGE for chain profit, are positive, as expected.  With
 
respect to the magnitude of the coefficients for RNWAGE in both of the
 
chain facilities are smaller which may indicate more power or
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resources in wage negotiations.  However the only coefficient which is
 
significant is that representing nonprofit homes.
 
It is interesting to note that the magnitude for prowage is
 
largest for both nonprofit and nonprofit chain ownership
 
classifications.  This may have a possible quality of care implication
 
in that it may indicate a heavier utilization of "professional staff"
 
than is seen either profit ownership categories.  However, only the
 
coefficient for nonprofit homes is significant at the five percent
 
level.  Similarly, in regards to nsfwag the coefficient is greater in
 
magnitude for the profit facilities.  This could indicate a higher
 
utilization of less skilled labor (i.e. nurses aides and LPN) than its
 
nonproprietary counterpart.
 
The magnitude of the coefficients for othwag on chain facilities
 
is greater than for the single standing facilities.  This lends
 
support to previous findings of chain homes spending more money than
 
nonchain homes on activities not directly related to patient care
 
(Hawes and Phillips, 1986; Meiners, 1982).
 
As expected the coefficients on tdays were all positive but were
 
not significant.  The sign of tdays2 is different depending on chain
 
affiliation.  While none of these coefficients are significant these
 
does support the theory that chain and nonchain homes have differing
 
cost structures (McKay, 1991).
 
The coefficients for percent private are all positive, although
 
none are significant at the five percent level.  The positive sign
 
indicates support for the Birnbaum et al. (1986) hypothesis that
 
private patients will demand more amenities thus will generate higher
 
costs.  The signs for the adl coefficients support Meiner's (1982) and
 
Shaugnessy's (1980) findings of increasing functional dependency
 
resulting in higher costs.
 
With respect to facility characteristics, the results are
 
surprising as there doesn't appear to be a relationship between the
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coefficient signs and ownership classification.  The coefficients for
 
tsery are all positive with the exception of chain profit homes,
 
however none of the coefficients are  significant at the five percent
 
level.
 
The dummy variables for ownership classification are consistent
 
with expectations, the nonp dummy is positive.  However, the cp
 
coefficient is positive while the cnon coefficient is negative which
 
is totally against intuition.
 
The findings for the restricted model parallel the unrestricted
 
model for the most part.  However there are some interesting
 
differences, such as the sign on percent private in the restricted
 
model.  In the unrestricted model the sign was positive, however in
 
the restricted model it is negative (but is not significant at the
 
five percent level).  This supports Birnbaum et al. (1986) opposing
 
hypothesis of private pay patients generating lower costs.  The
 
rationale behind this is since private pay patients are paying for
 
care out of their own pockets they are more sensitive to price.
 
The models are also different when one examines the output
 
measures.  In the restricted model both tdays and tdays2 are
 
significant and positive.
 
Another area in which the restricted model differs from the
 
unrestricted model is with respect to facility characteristics.  The
 
findings in the restricted model are much more intuitive.  For example
 
the signs of the coefficients representing ownership status are
 
consistent with previous findings.  Both nonprofit and chain nonprofit
 
coefficients are positive (prob value of .0001) and the chain profit
 
coefficient is negative but insignificant.  Another contrast between
 
the two models is that with the exception of the variables listed
 
above and tserv, R2, and R3 all variables are significant at the five
 
percent level in the restricted model.
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A comparison of the restricted and unrestricted models was done
 
using a Wald test.  Based on the result of the Wald test (p <.001) the
 
hypothesis that nursing home short run cost functions are identical
 
across ownership classifications is rejected.  These findings are in
 
accordance with  Silverburg's (1990) discussion of a cost functions
 
dependence on the firms behavioral assertions.
 
Both classifications of nonprofit institutions had higher
 
average direct patient expenditures than their proprietary
 
counterparts (Bonferroni Comparison significant at .05 level).  This
 
coincides with the majority of findings in the existing literature.
 
While this is not a direct measure of quality of care, it does support
 
the prevailing view that nonprofit institutions offer a higher quality
 
of care.
 
Theme Three: Charitable Wage Policies
 
Table 8 shows the results of the unrestricted and restricted
 
models depending on ownership type, for the Rnwage equation results.
 
Table 8.  Rnwage unrestricted and restricted model results.*
 
RESTRICTED
 UNRESTRICTED
 
Profit  Non  Profit  Non
 
Variable  Profit  Chain
  Profit
 
Chain
 
R.N. 
CHARACTERISTICS 
ATTED  137.27  25.22  -112.42  111.58  25.0 
(2.18)  (.26)  (1.72)  (.57)  (.63) 
RESCH  72.57 
(2.56) 
62.60 
(1.88) 
52.20 
(2.26) 
79.39 
(1.68) 
57.46 
(3.92) 
GERED  -51.11 
(.71) 
171.62 
(1.71) 
32.15 
(.37) 
163.54 
(.49) 
30.38 
(.65) 
MSGER  52.45  -30.30  -88.44  -36.83  -10.81 
(.69)  (.23)  (1.04)  (.107)  (.22) 
WNCA  73.04 
(2.17) 
-64.56 
(1.80) 
41.71 
(1.58) 
-66.21 
(1.42) 
15.64 
(.95) 
WMCA  -20.73  69.89  .093  8.72  11.23 
(.60)  (1.90)  (.003)  (.15)  (.66) 42 
Table 8.  Continued.
 
UNRESTRICTED	  RESTRICTED
 
Profit  Non  Profit  Non 
Variable  Profit  Chain  Profit 
Chain 
WMSPA  -22.03  -16.44  .712  -114.07  -26.56
 
(.69)  (.42)  (.024)  (2.03)  (1.51)
 
WNUTA	  -55.50  -54.39  -6.03  -38.60  -28.67
 
(1.50)  (1.18)  (.20)  (.72)  (1.50)
 
WPHAR	  38.69  -9.40  1.84  89.47  19.89
 
(1.16)  (.26)  (.07)  (1.72)  (1.17)
 
WSACT	  11.79  99.26  44.69  50.19  46.10
 
(.25)  (1.36)  (1.10)  (.55)  (1.78)
 
RNEXP  -1.18  2.00  -.40  .98  -0.18
 
(.94)  (1.41)  (.44)  (.46)  (.29)
 
INTERCEPT	  202.73  315.43
 
(3.07)	  (7.43)
 
NONP	  93.39  -5.62
 
(.80)  (.44)
 
CNONP	  26.53  -24.63
 
(.13)  (1.53)
 
CP	  211.54  -23.16
 
(2.33)	  (1.98)
 
R1  -25.74	  -31.66
 
(1.59)	  (2.02)
 
R2  -48.45	  -59.50
 
(3.24)	  (4.12)
 
R3  -31.57	  -35.19
 
(2.12)	  (2.41)
 
METRO	  18.25  25.17
 
(1.72)	  (2.44)
 
R-square  .1795	  .1128
 
Adj R-square  .0973	  .0834
 
* Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
 
As can be seen from examining Table 7, the results do not
 
conform to expectations in that several of the coefficients
 
representing training and education are negative.  However, with the
 
exception of wmspa for nonprofit chains, none of these coefficients
 
are significant at the five percent level.  When looking at these
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results one must not forget that the data is incomplete by failing to
 
account for fringe benefits.  This may help explain the paradox of
 
increased training/education/specialization leading to a decreasing
 
wage.
 
An F-test was used to compare the unrestricted and restricted
 
models.  The results of this test indicate that the restrictions
 
placed on the model do not harm the explanatory power of the model.
 
In other words, the affect of increased education or training does not
 
differ in its effect on average rnwage across ownership
 
classifications.  This indicates that the market mechanism,
 
independent of ownership type, determines average RN wages.
 
Also, there was no support found for the hypothesis that non­
profit facilities have a more philanthropic wage policy than their
 
proprietary counterparts.  As a matter of fact, although insignificant
 
at the five percent level, the results indicated that compared to
 
profit facilities both nonprofit and nonprofit chain facilities pay
 
less.  However, as explained in the model section, one must not
 
overlook the fact that fringe benefits were not included in the
 
calculation of average rnwage.  This is a major weakness in the model,
 
as one could argue nonprofit facilities may be more generous with
 
fringe benefits.
 
From the above analysis, we can conclude that the interaction
 
between ownership type and the level of education and training of
 
R.N's does not influence average rnwages.  However this analysis has
 
not yet addressed if there is a difference in the level of training
 
and education of R.N's amongst ownership types and the quality of
 
implications such a difference would have.
 
A Chi-Square analysis on the number of educational and training
 
activities that the RN's participated in, reveals a difference between
 
ownership types (p-value greater than .001).  Fourteen percent of RN's
 
in nonprofit and seventeen percent of RN's in chain nonprofit homes
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participated in more than 16 activities, compared to the nine percent
 
and seven percent of RN's in profit and chain profit homes
 
respectively.
 
One could very easily argue that this difference has quality of
 
care implications.  As a whole, the aged population faces different
 
health problems and constraints then the rest of the population.
 
Nurses who are specifically trained to administer this type care to
 
the elderly have a superior understanding of these problems and
 
constraints, and as a result deliver a more effective, higher quality
 
of care to their patients.  Donabedian characterizes this type of
 
quality "measurement"  as well as the above structural measures (i.e.
 
resources used) as indicative of quality of care.
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CHAPTER VI
 
CONCLUSION
 
The results indicate the estimation of direct patient care
 
expenditures are not independent of ownership classification.  More
 
specifically, ownership classification effects not only the intercept
 
but also has an interactive effect with other non-dummy variables.
 
This finding has important policy implications, in particular, nursing
 
home regulation needs to account for ownership classification.  If
 
reducing cost is a primary goal of policy, then different incentives/
 
regulations will have to be used on profit and nonprofit
 
organizations.
 
Percent of private pay patients was the only patient mix
 
criteria found to differ significantly amongst ownership type.  In
 
particular, non-profit homes were found to have higher percentages of
 
private pay patients.  In addition the percent private variable was
 
found to be endogenous, resulting in a single equation cost model
 
being inappropriate.
 
No support was found for the hypothesis of nonprofit
 
institutions having a more philanthropic wage policy.  Evidence was
 
found to support the hypothesis that nonprofit institutions offer a
 
higher quality of care, though employing a more specialized workforce
 
and through having higher direct patient care expenditures per
 
patient.
 
The fastest growing segment of our population is that over the
 
age of 85.  This group has a high likelihood of institutionalization
 
(Stults 1985).  With the growing pressures to contain
 
medicare/medicaid cost, it is imperative that an accurate
 
understanding of the elderly population and the cost structures of
 
nursing homes be understood if effective public policy is to be
 
formulated.
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Future research needs to be done in developing standard quality
 
of care and quality of life measures, and in refining nursing home
 
cost estimation.  Policy makers must take aggressive measures to
 
protect quality of care.  There is a desperate need for the
 
development of better quality of care and quality of life measures.
 
If this were available, and the score that a facility received was
 
either tied to government reimbursement rates or if stiff monetary
 
fines were given for failure to meet these standards, quality of care
 
could be attainable to everyone not just private patients.  The
 
development of such measures will not be an easy feat but they are
 
necessary to protect consumers of nursing home care.
 
In addition to the above, our society must drastically improve
 
its practice of preventative medicine.  Epidemiologic evidence
 
indicate that interventions with individuals above 65 in such things
 
as physical activity, smoking cessation, and social factors can aid in
 
preserving good functional status thus postponing the need for long
 
term care (Kaplan, 1989).
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